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The IRS's Recent Uncertain Tax Positions Initiative:
A Tangle of Accounting, Tax and Privilege Issues
Kathryn J. Kennedy*
Executive Summary: Given the extremely limited source of re-
sources available to the IRS in recent years, it's not surprising that it
is exploring all sorts of avenues to increase its efficiency, particu-
larly relying on corporate taxpayers to self report questionable tax
positions. Under the banner of "corporate governance" and "trans-
parency," the Service issued a series of proposals in 2010 requiring
disclosure of uncertain tax positions ("UTPs") by corporate taxpay-
ers. The Service essentially piggybacked on the recently imposed
2006 audit requirements that reserves be posted for contingent tax
liabilities (i.e., tax positions that could later not be sustained, and
therefore had to be paid), by requiring such reserves to be disclosed
on the financial statements for corporations.1 Disclosure of ques-
tionable tax positions would normally be mandated by legislation
under the federal Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") 2 or com-
pelled through civil tax provisions that impose penalties if positions
are not disclosed. However, the Service relied on neither, assuming
that its authority under the "returns" provisions of the Code was
sufficient. The author is extremely critical of the Service using its
powers under the Code for non-tax policy measures, including cor-
porate governance, and opines that unintended consequences usu-
ally result from such endeavors.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Summary of the Issues
For tax years beginning after December 15, 2006, the accounting
rules dramatically changed with the promulgation of FIN 48, such that
publicly traded entities had to report income tax expenses that were
* Kathryn J. Kennedy is a professor of law at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago and
Associate Dean for Advanced Studies and Research. Special thanks go to her colleague, Profes-
sor Art Acevedo and research assistants Joung-Joo Ashley Ahn and Jason Faust for their assis-
tance in writing this article.
1. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 48, AccouNT-
ING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES: AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT No. 109
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aopFIN48.pdf [here-
inafter FIN 481.
2. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., is referred to as the "Code" in the text and will
appear abbreviated as I.R.C.
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more in sync with tax expenses in the event the entity was audited and
challenged by the federal and state tax authorities.3 Uncertain Tax
Positions ("UTPs"), defined as those contingent tax liabilities that
could be incurred if the tax position in question was not later sus-
tained, had to be reported as reserves under audited financial state-
ments prepared under generally acceptable accounting standards.4 In
determining these contingent liabilities, taxpayers, their accountants,
and their attorneys need to produce supporting workpapers, referred
to as tax accrual workpapers.5 Such workpapers, if disclosed to the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or the "Service"), could provide a
"road map" for the Service to question the tax positions taken by the
taxpayer. 6
At the federal level, the IRS has had a policy of restraint, stating
that it would not request tax accrual workpapers except in unusual
circumstances, in order to promote the integrity of the financial state-
ments and the independence of the outside auditors. 7 Without this
protection, it was feared that taxpayers would be reluctant to disclose
UTPs to their independent outside auditors, resulting in misleading
financial statements. Under its summons powers, the IRS may re-
quest the workpapers in unusual situations, but there are a variety of
privileges - attorney-client privilege, federally authorized tax practi-
tioner privilege ("FATP"), and the work product doctrine - that could
be asserted by the taxpayer to block such summons.8 In recent years,
the Service has been aggressive in asserting its summons powers under
the Code, thereby attempting to negate privilege on the part of the
taxpayer. 9
3. FIN 48, supra note 1.
4. FIN 48, supra note 1, at Summary, How the Conclusions in This Interpretation Relate to the
Conceptual Framework.
5. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.10.20.1 [hereinafter I.R.M.I.
6. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 546 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J., dissenting)
(noting that the IRS wanted disclosure of the tax accrual papers because they "focus and concen-
trate the Service's energy" and "may be useful to the IRS as a 'road map' through a company's
tax return." Thus, such disclosure was simply for "the convenience of the Service." (emphasis
added)).
7. See I.R.M., supra note 5, §§ 4.10.20.3(2), 4.10.20.3.1, stating that such workpapers would be
requested in "unusual circumstances" (including where the taxpayer has participated in a listed
transaction), that such request would not be "as a matter of standard examining procedure," and
that requests would be limited to the "portion of the workpapers that is material and relevant to
the examination."
8. I.R.C. § 7602 (2006).
9. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 465 U.S. 805, 808-09 (1984); Regions Fin. Corp. v.
United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008 (N.D. Ala. 2008); United States v.
Textron, 577 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
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The IRS received a favorable 2009 decision from the First Circuit
where the IRS issued a summons for taxpayer accrual workpapers
that was initially challenged on the grounds of privilege, but later af-
firmed by the court.10 Spurred on by this decision, the Service an-
nounced in early 2010, using its powers under the returns provisions
(and not the summons powers), that it would propose mandatory dis-
closure of UTPs by certain corporate taxpayers on accompanying
schedules to their corporate federal returns.11 The goal was to im-
prove the Service's efficiency in audits, piggybacking on the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") audit standards that required
disclosure of UTPs and the posting of reserves. Under the guise of
corporate transparency and better corporate governance, the IRS's in-
itial proposal would have required disclosure of individual UTPs on
certain taxpayers' tax returns, including the analysis of the legal pros
and cons of a specific tax position, the probability of litigation, and the
maximum tax liability that could result if the position was not sus-
tained.12 Such a pervasive approach raises questions as to why the
internal or outside attorneys for the taxpayer would even engage in
such dialogue if such documents were then to be disclosable under the
work product doctrine. As expected, the backlash from the corporate
business, legal, and accounting communities was enormous.
As the IRS's initial approach to requiring disclosure of items al-
ready being reported under FIN 48 did not evaluate its implication for
privilege issues, the Service considered revisions and then issued its
final proposal in September 2010 and reaffirmed its policy of restraint,
thereby attempting to pacify the practitioners' concerns over privi-
lege.1 3 It also issued proposed regulations regarding its authority to
promulgate such disclosure through its returns powers in September
of 2010.14 However, whether its final position will sustain privilege
challenges in more controversial non-restraint contexts and whether it
has the power under the returns statutes are open issues for the courts
to decide. Other outstanding issues consider whether the Service will
seek Congress' assistance in providing penalties for failure to comply
with the new requirements and whether the Service is attempting to
impose higher disclosure standards under existing penalty rules.
Given Congress' most recent cooperation with the Service in imple-
10. See United States v. Textron, 577 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2009).
11. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
12. Id.
13. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010) and I.R.S. An-
nouncement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
14. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2 (Sept. 9, 2010).
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menting higher penalties for nondisclosure of positions that lack eco-
nomic substance, 15 it may support the Service's recent initiatives
through new penalties for nondisclosure of UTPs.
This article traces the history and reasons for the Service's imple-
mentation of the new UTP reporting and disclosure requirements in
2010, addressing the tangle of issues relating to accounting, privilege,
and tax disclosure, each of which has different purposes and goals.
The article is divided into five parts: the financial standards required
under generally applicable accounting standards, applicable to most
publicly traded companies, requiring the posting of contingent tax
reserves (UTPs); federal tax reporting and disclosure requirements
existing under the Code and its regulations pre-2010, with resulting
penalties for noncompliance; the scope of the privilege doctrines for
attorneys, accountants, and taxpayers; the IRS's new UTP approaches
as they have evolved during 2010; and prospects for the future. The
article then critiques the long-term usefulness of the Service's position
for 2011 and beyond.
Everyone agrees that 2011 will be a significant year for U.S. tax
administration and enforcement initiatives. 16 In the context of corpo-
rate governance initiatives and circumvention of existing privileges or
the work product doctrine, the author has been critical of using the
Internal Revenue Code to implement or circumvent non-tax policy
concerns. 17 This article will be no exception. What's for certain is that
the issue of UTP reporting and disclosure marks a new battleground
between corporate taxpayers and the IRS. This is unfortunate as the
issue of corporate tax reform is now on the drawing board for Con-
gress and the President, and the IRS's new initiatives have undoubt-
edly tainted the corporate taxpayers' expectations that very much will
change.
B. Concerns for the Service
The U.S. federal tax system relies on a voluntary tax compliance
and self-reporting process in order to collect expected taxes assessed
under the federal income tax code. 18 Taxpayers sign under penalties
15. Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (adding I.R.C. § 6662(i)).
16. Marie Sapirie, Next Year to Be Significant for Tax Administration, Wilkins Says, 129 TAX
NoTEs 1296, 1296 (2010).
17. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to
Curb Perceived Abuses, 10 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 196 (2010); Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on
the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation Plans, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487 (2002).
18. The Internal Revenue Code relies on civil delinquency penalties under I.R.C. § 6651
(2006) and criminal penalties for failure to file a return or to pay taxes under I.R.C § 7203 (2006)
to compel taxpayers to file returns and pay owed taxes. A voluntary self-assessment tax system
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of perjury on their tax returns that the return is true, accurate, and
complete. 19 In non-tax contexts, a taxpayer wouldn't be able to swear
to the accuracy of a given statement without its belief that the state-
ment is true; yet the corporate taxpayer signs its tax return knowing
that certain tax positions are not sustainable if challenged.20 Due to
the complexity and sometimes lack of guidance of the Code, there are
a variety of different standards used by the Code, common law, and
courts, in assessing a taxpayer's position.21 This dichotomy sets up the
issue whereby a taxpayer can report and pay a given tax that could
likely be later challenged and increased upon audit or litigation, along
with interest and penalties for understatement. Mixed into the equa-
tion is whether disclosure of the underlying tax accrual workpapers
associated with the UTPs is covered by one or more privileges that
could be asserted.
Between what is actually reported versus actually taxed is referred
to as the "tax gap."'22 The IRS has been fighting an uphill battle in
recent years in bridging that gap due to limitations on its enforcement
efforts. 23 The gap is more pronounced in the corporate tax commu-
nity due to its size of revenue and complexity of returns, in compari-
son with the individual taxpayer community. Using the popular
herald of "corporate governance" and "greater transparency," the
Service has attempted to promote greater disclosure in hopes of dis-
covering what issues it should be auditing and targeting.24 One should
is premised on the theory that the taxpayer has knowledge of all the relevant facts and should be
responsible to determine the correct amount of tax. See Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance:
"This Return Might Be Correct But Probably Isn't," 29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 671 (2010).
19. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2006). See, e.g., I.R.S. Form 1040; I.R.S. Form 1120.
20. See Calvin Johnson, 'True and Correct': Standards for Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX
NoTEs 1521, 1521 (1989).
21. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 546 (5th Cir. 1982):
The income tax laws, as every citizen knows, are far from a model of clarity. Written to
accommodate a multitude of competing policies and differing situations, the Internal
Revenue Code is a sprawling tapestry of almost infinite complexity. Its details and
intricate provisions have fostered a wealth of interpretations. To thread one's way
through this maze, the business or wealthy taxpayer needs the mind of a Talmudist and
the patience of Job.
22. See UNDERSTANDING THE TAX GAP, I.R.S. FACT SHEET (2005), available at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137246,00.html
23. See id., in which the IRS notes the three components that produce the tax gap: nonfiling,
underreporting, and underpayment. The underreporting of income tax, employment taxes, and
other taxes represents about 80 percent of the gap. For the 2001 tax year, the Service estimated
that all taxpayers paid $1.767 trillion on time, which represented and 83 percent to 85 percent of
the total amount due. The 2001 tax gap ranged from $312 billion to $353 billion for all types of
taxes.
24. Douglas Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Prepared Remarks to the
American Bar Association (Sept. 24, 2010).
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question whether it is good tax policy for the Service to have taxpay-
ers self-report questionable tax positions rather than have the Service
resolve such questionable positions and determine for itself what to
audit. However, given its limited resources, this certainly was a strate-
gic position for it to take.
The tax gap is partially due to the fact that U.S. corporations face
considerably higher corporate tax rates nationally than their competi-
tion in the global economy. U.S. corporations are now faced with the
U.S.'s high 35 percent (federal corporate rate tax) and 39 percent (av-
erage state corporate tax included) tax rates, which are expected to be
the highest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment ("OECD") after Japan reduces its rate in April of 2011. 25
Thus, many are either deciding to shift more jobs and investment
abroad with foreign affiliates or take more aggressive tax positions in
order to achieve an effective tax rate more comparable to the interna-
tional corporate rate of 22 percent. 26 Congress understands that re-
duced corporate rates could produce more revenue by keeping jobs in
the U.S. instead of losing them to jurisdictions with lower tax rates.27
Ideally, good tax policy would tax all economic activity alike, and
would not rely on tax code provisions to reallocate resources. How-
ever, excessive marginal tax rates produce incentives for all taxpayers,
not just corporate taxpayers, to hide, shelter, and under-report
income.
While the new UTP disclosure rules promote greater transparency
and efficiency, the policy is for the benefit of the IRS, not the taxpay-
ers.28 The end analysis is a hostile environment pitting attorneys
against accountants and providing IRS agents with an upper hand in
the audit process. While the end product improves efficiency for the
IRS, the question that must be raised is at whose cost? But before
solely criticizing the IRS for its position, this newest standoff between
the IRS and the business community is also due in part to Congress'
continued poor oversight in providing adequate policy structure and
25. See Martin Feldstein, Want to Boost the Economy? Lower Corporate Tax Rates, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 15, 2010, at A15.
26. See Meg Shreve, Sessions Open to Paying for Corporate Tax Cut, 130 TAX NoTEs 632, 632
(2011); Feldstein, supra note 25. Since 1995, twenty-four of the European Union countries have
cut their corporate tax rates. See Daniel Mitchell, Corporate Taxes: America Is Falling Behind,
CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULLETIN (July 2007).
27. Shreve, supra note 26; Feldstein, supra note 25; Mitchell, supra note 26.
28. According to Barry Shott, former deputy commissioner (international) of the then IRS
Large and Mid-Size Business Division (now LB&I), the "division's case load for both corpora-
tions and partnerships has grown exponentially in the past few years," prompting the Service to
rethink its use of resources. Alison Bennett, UTP Disclosure a Continued Focus for IRS In
Looking at Taxpayers, Guidance Decisions, DAILY TAX REPORT G-6 (Feb. 18, 2011).
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specific tax guidance through the Code. Thankfully, there is a re-
newed dialogue in 2011 between Congress and the president to sim-
plify the Code for corporations.
II. FINANCIAL STANDARDS REQUIRED UNDER GAAP
A. Accounting Scandals and Financial Meltdown
The Securities Exchange Act of 193429 ("34 Act") is known as a
full-disclosure statute, requiring registered corporations to disclose a
wide range of information to shareholders. Publicly traded corpora-
tions are required under the 34 Act to have independent auditors cer-
tify their financial statements in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards. 30 The financial meltdowns of such prominent
firms as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco led Congress to call for greater
corporate governance rules, especially with respect to the reporting of
the corporation's financial statements. 31 Of late, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") has been using its power under the
statute to promote greater corporate governance. In 2002, Congress
passed The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"),32 referred to by
then chairman of the SEC as "the most important securities legislation
since the original federal securities laws of the 1930's."'33 The law re-
quires the board of directors' audit committee to be fully independent
and to have the ability to supervise the auditors and assess their ten-
ure and compensation.34 The auditors must report solely to the audit
committee and are required to report financial weaknesses within the
29. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2006).
30. See Definitions of terms used in Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (2009). "Gener-
ally accepted auditing standards" are set forth by a committee of the public accounting profes-
sion's national organization, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).
See also CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing
Standards No. 1, § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1973).
31. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks to the
National Press Club (July 30, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch073003whd.htm.
32. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (2006).
33. Donaldson, supra note 31.
34. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(m)(2):
The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as committee of the board of direc-
tors, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of
the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including
resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial
reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and
each such registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee.
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corporation's financial statements.35 The audit committee also re-
solves conflicts between management and the auditors.
To make management accountable, the corporation's CEO and
CFO must attest and certify that the financial statements are accurate
and complete, under penalties of perjury.36 Any disclosures regarding
the financial statement must be certified as "fairly present in all mate-
rial respects. '37 SOX caused auditors to truly focus on the corpora-
tion's internal controls as they relate to its financial statements, so that
financial positions were documented and complete.38 The result is
greater transparency in the numbers that are reported.
B. FIN No. 48 "Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes"
The goal of standards for financial statements is to provide predica-
ble and transparent financial statements enabling investors to com-
pare and evaluate business entities. Under federal securities law,
publicly traded businesses must use Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP") in producing their audited financial state-
ments.39 Those principles require the reporting of certain contingent
liabilities, including contingent tax liabilities.40 In 1975, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") issued Financial Accounting
Standards ("FAS") No. 5, entitled, "Accounting for Contingencies. '4 1
That standard acknowledged a contingent tax liability on the financial
statement (referred to as a "reserve") if it was probable and estima-
ble, assuming that the taxing bodies had full knowledge of all the
facts, that the corporation would lose tax benefits.4 2
Under this standard, all tax benefits reported on the corporate tax
return were assumed valid, but liabilities were reserved for the poten-
tial loss of the tax benefits upon audit. All tax positions were com-
bined for purposes of determining a single reserve, and the auditor
could consider the possibility that the IRS may not look at each indi-
vidual tax issue and that issues could be appealed at the IRS level. 43
35. Id. §§ 204, 302.
36. Id. § 302.
37. Id. § 302(a)(3).
38. Id. § 404.
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i), 78(m) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 210 et seq. (2009).
40. FASB INTERPRETATION No. 5, ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (Fin. Accounting Stan-
dards Bd. 1975) (applicable to income taxes, as well as payroll and excise taxes).
41. Id.
42. Id. 8, whereby "probable" was defined as "likely to occur" and was thought to mean a
seventy-five percent or more chance of occurring.
43. FIN 48, supra note 1, T B20.
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In 1992, FASB provided additional income tax rules in FAS No.
109, entitled "Accounting for Income Taxes," but it did not speak to
the issue of accounting for contingent tax liabilities.44 Due to incon-
sistencies that were developing between the reporting of UTPs (which
led to difficulty in comparing financials of corporations), FASB re-
vised the issue of reserves and issued "Accounting for Uncertainty in
Income Taxes" in June of 2006.45 This interpretation, which is com-
monly referred to as FIN 48, revised and supplemented FAS No. 109.
In a nutshell, under the new FIN 48 standard, UTPs are financially
accounted reserves (i.e., reported liabilities) for tax positions taken by
a corporation that are not "more likely than not" to be supported
upon IRS examination or if litigated, supported by the courts.46 The
intent behind the contingent liability is to disclose to shareholders po-
tential liabilities that could result if a corporation's tax return is later
disputed upon audit and assessed greater taxes (hence, liabilities
should be reserved for such an event).
The goals of FIN 48 were to quantify the liability for UTPs; provide
more consistent standards in recognizing, derecognizing and measur-
ing tax benefits; and to require disclosure of such positions for years
open under the applicable statute of limitations. 47 It is generally ap-
plicable to C corporations, non-for-profit entities, pass-through enti-
ties such as S corporations, and combined or consolidated financial
statements. 48 Only material tax positions are subject to FIN 48 and
the reserve or determination of whether or not to reserve are based
on estimates, not detailed determinations. 49 The drafters of FIN 48
rejected the idea that only tax positions characterized by (1) substan-
tial uncertainty (e.g., tax shelters, listed transactions) or (2) nontax-
able and nondeductible differences between financial statements and
tax returns (referred to as permanent differences) be disclosed.50
44. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB INTERPRETATION No. 109, AC-
COUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES (1992) [hereafter FIN 109].
45. FIN 48, supra note 1. FIN 48 is effective for years beginning after December 15, 2006
(calendar year 2007 for calendar-year taxpayers). The effective date was delayed for private
entities until years beginning after December 15, 2008. FIN 48 is applicable to not-for-profit
entities, pass through entities, and entities entitled to a dividend paid deduction (e.g., REIT or
RIC).
46. FIN 48, supra note 1, 5.
47. FIN 48, supra note 1, at Summary, How the Conclusions in This Interpretation Relate t o
the Conceptual Framework, and 21.
48. FIN 48, supra note 1, at Summary and 68; FIN 109, supra note 44, App. E, Glossary
(see definitions of nonpublic enterprise and public enterprise).
49. FIN 48, supra note 1, 1 7.
50. FIN 48, supra note 1, 1 Bll.
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In an effort to improve uniformity and transparency, FIN 48 revised
the standard for the reporting and accounting of contingent liabilities
UTPs.51 The new standard was a considerable change from the pre-
FIN 48 standards. FIN 48 applied its methodology on an issue-by-
issue basis (referred to under FIN 48 as a "unit of account"), instead
of an aggregate approach. It also adopted a two-step process in deter-
mining whether a contingent tax liability should be reserved. The first
step is to determine whether the tax position taken on the financial
statement had a "more likely than not" (i.e., more than 50 percent)
chance of being sustained upon an IRS examination or in litigation
with the IRS.52 If the answer is yes, no reserve needs to be recognized
under FIN 48. If the tax position failed the "more likely than not"
standard, the second step requires that a reserve is recognized equal
to the highest amount of tax benefits greater than 50 percent likely to
be realized upon settlement with the IRS (including interest and pos-
sible penalties), not the maximum tax that the IRS could potentially
receive. 53 Thus, when a corporation takes a tax benefit without post-
ing a reserve on its financial statements, it is affirming that such bene-
fits are more likely than not to be sustained if challenged by the IRS.54
Conversely, if a tax position fails the more likely than not standard, a
related reserve generally must be posted for the UTP. 55
Under the first criterion, referred to as the "recognition" threshold,
the taxpayer determines the likelihood that the tax position will be
upheld upon examination, including related appeals and litigation,
"based on the technical merits of the position. ' 56 It assumes the IRS
has full knowledge of the law and applicable facts, and does not con-
sider issue trading.57 It is also assumed that the IRS will examine the
51. FIN 48, supra note 1, 1 B73.
52. This is referred to as the "recognition" threshold. See FIN 48, supra note 1, 6. The test
is based on the tax law in effect as of the GAAP reporting date and assumes that the IRS has full
knowledge of all the facts used in taking the tax position on the return. FIN 48, supra note 1,
8. There is a very narrow exception for certain administrative practices and precedents. FIN 48,
supra note 1, 1 B35. The recognition threshold also must presume the issue would be challenged
upon audit; therefore the probability of an audit cannot be factored into this stage. FIN 48 does
not presume that legal tax opinions are necessary to justify the "more likely than not" recogni-
tion threshold; such opinions can be external evidence to justify management's decision. FIN 48,
supra note 1, 1 B34.
53. FIN 48, supra note 1, 1$ 6-8.
54. FIN 48, supra note 1, 6.
55. FIN 48, supra note 1, at Summary, How the Conclusions in This Interpretation Relate to the
Conceptual Framework.
56. FIN 48, supra note 1, 7.
57. FIN 48, supra note 1, 7. There is a possible exception permitting for "administrative
practices and precedents." See FIN 48, supra note 1, 1 A13 (applying the administrative practice
exception for de minimis amounts).
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position; thus, one does not factor in the probability of an audit. If the
tax position satisfies the more likely than not standard, no reserve
needs to be posted. Under the second criterion, referred to as the
"measurement" threshold, there needs to be an estimated reserve, not
a precise determination, as to the greatest amount of the benefit more
than 50 percent that is likely to be realized upon settlement with the
IRS (not what could be realized upon litigation). 58 Thus, the corpora-
tion reports the tax benefit "at the largest amount of benefit that is
greater than a 50 percent likelihood of being realized upon ultimate
settlement." 59
Using the example in FIN 48, if the corporation had a tax position
resulting in a benefit of $100, it would examine the amounts and
probabilities of possible outcomes as follows: 60
Individual Cumulative
Probability of Probability of
Possible Outcome Occurring (%) Occurring (%)
$100 Best settlement 5% 5%
$80 Likely negotiated settlement 25% 30%
$60 Probable IRS settlement 25% 55%61
Thus, for a tax position of $100, the corporation would record a
reserve of $60, as it has a cumulative probability of 55 percent, which
is a "more than 50%" chance of recognition of a tax benefit of $60.62
There are two important exceptions to consider in avoiding disclo-
sure of a UTP reserve. The first arises in those situations where the
taxpayer "expects to litigate" and assesses that it will be more likely
than not to prevail on the merits, even though it has determined that
the probability of settling with the IRS is less than 50 percent. 63 Thus,
there needs to be evidence that the taxpayer intended to litigate,
58. FIN 48, supra note 1, 8.
59. FIN 48, supra note 1, 8.
60. FIN 48, supra note 1, 1 A21.
61. 55 percent represents the percentage that is the largest amount of tax benefit that is
greater than 50 percent likely of being realized on settlement.
62. FIN 48, supra note 1, A23.
63. See FIN 48, supra note 1, $1 A2-A3 (stating that "the measurement of the tax position is
based on management's best judgment of the amount the taxpayer would ultimately accept in a
settlement with taxing authorities.") (emphasis added). Corporations and auditors state that this
provides an expectation for positions that the taxpayer is expected to litigation and there is a
more likely than not chance of winning on the merits). See also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER,
2010 GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES § 16.4.1.5 (2010). As FIN 48, supra note 1,
8, refers to the taxpayer's ability to settle with the taxing authorities, taxpayers have argued that
should the tax position be litigated and there is a greater than 50 percent chance of success, no
reserve is needed.
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which in the context of many large corporations is not an issue. Sec-
ond, if the taxpayer has taken a tax position without sufficient sup-
port, it can avoid recording a reserve if the IRS has had an
administrative practice of not examining or challenging that
position. 64
In preparing financial statements, tax-related workpapers are pro-
duced in three types: audit workpapers, tax accrual workpapers, 65 and
reconciliation workpapers. 66 Audit workpapers are usually prepared
by or for the taxpayer's outside auditors, indicating how the audit was
conducted (e.g., tests done, information requests, procedures used to
document) to attest that the financial statements were performed in
accordance with GAAP.67 According to the Internal Revenue Man-
ual, taxpayer accrual workpapers "relate to the tax reserve for cur-
rent, deferred and potential or contingent tax liabilities, however
classified or reported on audited financial statements, and to foot-
notes disclosing those tax reserves on audited financial statements.
They reflect an estimate of the company's tax liabilities. '68 Such
workpapers may reside with the taxpayer, the taxpayer's auditor, or
the taxpayer's third party advisor (e.g., attorney). Lastly, there are tax
reconciliation workpapers, which represent the data used in assem-
bling the tax return. These will include schedules that reconcile net
income with taxable income using book or financial statements.69
In ascertaining the recognition and measurement of the reserve
used in the tax accrual workpapers, documentation is necessary. This
includes identifying the position; factual information to determine
amounts; technical merits of the position, which may involve a legal
opinion weighing the pros and cons of the position; the taxing author-
ity's past administrative practices in pursuing such positions; the
probability of prevailing on the merits; and factors used in ascertain-
64. See FIN 48, supra note 1, 11 A12, B35.
65. These documents are referred to by other names, such as noncurrent tax accounts and tax
pool analysis. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1982).
66. I.R.M., supra note 5, § 4.10.20.
67. According to I.R.M., supra note 5, § 4.10.20.2(1), "audit workpapers may include work
programs, analyses, memoranda, letters of confirmation and representation, abstracts of com-
pany documents, and schedules or commentaries prepared or obtained by the auditor."
68. I.R.M., supra note 5, § 4.10.20.2(2). Such workpapers may show "an audit trail and/or
complete explanation of the transactions," whether positions where dependent upon legal advice
or information "describing or evaluating the tax strategies." I.R.M., supra note 5,
§ 4.10.20.2(2)(A).
69. Note that large corporate taxpayers provide such reconciliation of book-tax income differ-
ences on Schedule M-3.
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ing settlement estimates.70 In determining the "more likely than not"
standard, the taxpayer generally makes an assessment using attorney
opinion letters and spreadsheets with relevant data in determining
whether the economic benefit of the tax position can be realized, as-
suming that the tax authorities know all the relevant facts.71 Taxpay-
ers and their advisors may have to exercise considerable judgment in
applying FIN 48's standards. For example, legal research, legal opin-
ions, risk assessments, alternative IRS approaches, and similar work
product may be derived by internal and external CPAs and attorneys.
Depending on the level of detail in these tax accrual workpapers, the
workpapers could provide the Service with a roadmap in ascertaining
the taxpayer's tax "soft spots." '72
The Service regards the documentation used to identify the reserves
under FIN 48 as tax accrual workpapers.73 As the taxpayer normally
shares this information with independent outside auditors in order to
secure an unqualified audit opinion, the issue arose as to whether such
information continued to be privileged. This subject will be discussed
in full in Part IV of this article.
If there are changes in subsequent periods, prior UTPs must be re-
viewed for open tax years to discover if new recognition or de-recog-
nition is called for and whether there is a change in the
measurement. 74 FIN 48 also prescribes disclosure requirements in the
corporation's annual financial statements, with tabular reconciliations
for public companies, the effective tax rate utilized, and penalties and
interest.75 Due to the recent changes in tax disclosures of UTPs, the
70. FIN 48, supra note 1, B34. Included in such documentation would be materials used to
ascertain any risk assessment for the tax position, its size and scope, the technical issues involv-
ing the tax issue, identification of the position, its description, analysis of authority and conclu-
sion. Large corporations may have an outside attorney's or accountant's opinion letter to
support its decision. This requirement is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 302 and 404's re-
quirements that written documentation is required for taxpayers to justify its FIN 48 conclusions.
See FIN 48, supra note 1, 8.
71. FIN 48, supra note 1, at Summary, How This Interpretation Will Improve Financial
Reporting.
72. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984).
73. See I.R.S. LMSB Comm'r Mem., 04-0507-044 (May 10, 2007) and I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
2007-0012 (Mar. 22, 2007), Documentation for FIN 48 Compliance Considered Tax Accrual
Workpapers, 2007 TAx NoTEs TODAY 112-15 (2007).
74. FIN 48, supra note 1, 10.
75. See FIN 48, supra note 1, 21 (requiring disclosure of positions taken on the tax return
but not currently disclosed on the financial statements). Disclosure requires (1) a tabular recon-
ciliation of unrecognized tax benefits at the beginning and end of the year, (2) projection regard-
ing any change in unrecognized tax benefits in the next year, (3) the effective of the tax rate on
the unrecognized tax benefits, (4) a list of all open tax years under the affected statute of limita-
tions, and (5) any tax-related penalties and interest recognized on the financial statements.
Thus, all uncertain tax positions impact the financial statements.
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Service looked to such accounting disclosures in attempting to more
efficiently administer the Code.
Prior to the issuance of FIN 48, FASB received 118 comment letters
on its exposure draft and subsequently held public discussions.76
Some commentators objected to the tabular reconciliation that FIN 48
required, suggesting that it would provide a "roadmap" for the taxing
authorities.77 FASB rejected these objections for several reasons: it
did not equate the taxing authorities with a counterpart in litigation,
disclosure at the aggregate level did not provide information about
individual UTP, and the IRS had recently adopted a detailed reconcil-
iation requirement noting differences between amounts reported for
tax versus financial purposes.78
C. Use of FIN 48's Standard by Other Authorities
The FIN 48 "more likely than not" standard has been used by other
regulators as well. Under the U.S. Department of Treasury Circular
230 regulations, the "more likely than not" standard must be satisfied
by accountants, attorneys, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries who
practice before the IRS in order for taxpayers to rely on their written
tax advice for penalty protection. 79
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") is-
sued Rule 3522 in June 2006, which prohibits a registered public ac-
counting firm from providing services to an audit client that relies on
the marketing, planning, or rendering an opinion on an "aggressive
tax position." 80 In defining an "aggressive tax position," Rule 3522
states that it is a position "that was initially recommended, directly or
indirectly, by the registered public accounting firm and a significant
purpose of which is tax avoidance, unless the proposed tax treatment
is at least more likely than not to be allowable under applicable tax
laws."'81 Failure to adhere to the PCAOB's Rule could result in the
compromise of the accounting firm's independence.
The 2007 Small Business Tax Act altered the standard under I.R.C.
§ 6694(a), which is a penalty provision for tax preparers who do not
meet the "realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits" or
"reasonable belief that the position is more likely than not to be sus-
76. FIN 48, supra note 1, 9 B3.
77. FIN 48, supra note 1, B64.
78. FIN 48, supra note 1, 1 B64.
79. Dep't of Treasury Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2010).
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tained" standards. 82 Thus, tax positions that are not adequately dis-
closed must meet such standard to avoid penalty.
III. REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
CODE BEGINNING IN 2010
A. IRS's Operating Divisions
The Service administers the Code through four main operating divi-
sions, one of which is known as the Large Business and International
Division ("LB&I").83 Heather Maloy is the commissioner of LB&I
and was recently nominated by Tax Notes as the 2010 Person of the
Year.84 The renaming and reconfiguration of this unit came about
when the Service realized that international tax issues were not being
adequately served in a single unit within the IRS.85
Initially in October 2009, IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman pi-
qued the public's interest during the National Association of Corpo-
rate Directors Governance conference, indicating that corporate risk
and transparency could best be served through the reporting of UTPs,
making the administration of the tax system more efficient.86 The no-
tion was that if the accountants needed UTPs to be ascertained and
disclosed for generally acceptable accounting standards, why
shouldn't the IRS ask for a list of these positions and their amounts to
better ascertain whom to audit, what issues to audit, and the magni-
tude of the problem? Given that the accountants already had these
positions and their reserves, not much additional work would be re-
quired of taxpayers. It was in Maloy's first six months on the job that
the IRS issued Announcement 2010-9, proposing the development of
a new tax return schedule for large businesses under the jurisdiction of
LB&I to annually disclose UTPs to the Service. 87
At a George Washington University Internal Tax Conference (co-
hosted by the IRS), Commissioner Shulman again reiterated his goal
of reaching out to corporate boards in order "to promote good corpo-
82. Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246, 121 Stat. 190 (2007) (amending I.R.C. § 6694(a)).
83. The LB&I division was formerly the Large and Midsize Business division, renamed after
the passage of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) that adopted new reporting
and withholding requirements.
84. Tax Analyst, The 2010 Person of the Year, 130 TAX NOTES TODAY 7 (2011).
85. See I.R.S., 2009 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
(ACT) REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/tege.act-rpt9.pdf.
86. Douglas Shulman, IRS Comm'r, Prepared Remarks to the National Association of Corpo-
rate Directors Governance Conference in Washington D.C. (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http:/
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=214451,00.html.
87. 2010-9 I.R.B. 408.
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rate governance on tax issues and to engage the corporate community
in discussing the appropriate role for the board of directors in address-
ing tax risk oversight.
88
B. Returns and Penalties for Noncompliance
In order to better understand the Service's initial proposal for
UTPs, it is helpful to first understand the level of tax disclosure re-
quired, the penalties for understating taxes, and the Service's policy of
restraint regarding the required disclosure of information that existed
before 2010. The Service has two powerful tools in its tax arsenal:
returns and related schedules, and the power to summons books and
records.
The Internal Revenue Code requires corporations subject to tax
under Subtitle A to make a return with respect to their income. 89 Per-
sons or entities required to make a return or statement to the IRS
must conform to the forms and regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary, including information required by such forms or regulations. 90
The IRS uses tax returns and associated schedules so that taxpayers
recognize questionable and abusive tax schedules. The IRS's proce-
dural regulations rely on taxpayers to self-assess the amount of tax
due and to file returns based on facts that can determine and assess
the taxes due.91
Typically corporations are required to make and to file federal cor-
porate tax returns using Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Re-
turn.92 The return must be "sufficient" in order to begin the running
of the statute of limitations and to avoid penalties for failure to file a
return. As such, the return must use the proper form, provide infor-
mation necessary for the IRS to compute the tax, and be signed under
penalties of perjury. Using the proper form is sufficient if it contains
information "on which the substantial correctness of the self-assess-
ment may be judged. '93 Corporations with reported total assets of
$10 million or more on Schedule L of Form 1120 are also required to
88. See DELOrITE, PROPOSED U.S. TAX REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR UNCERTAIN TAX
POSITIONS: THE LATEST STEP IN A JOURNEY TOWARD ENHANCED TAX GOVERNANCE AND
TRANSPARENCY 5 (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.con/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Lo-
cal%2OAssets/Documents/rax/us_taxUTP_042010.pdL
89. I.R.C. § 6012 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
90. I.R.C. § 6011 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
91. Summary of General Tax Procedure, 26 C.F.R. § 601.103 (2010).
92. Alternate forms and schedules are filed by life insurance companies (Form 1120L); by
property and casualty insurance companies (Form 1120PC); by foreign corporations (Form
1120F); by personal holding companies (Schedule PH with Form 1120); and by mutual insurance
companies (Form 1120M).
93. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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complete and file Schedule M-3, which reconciles book-tax income
differences. 94 While FIN 48 requires certain reserves for accounting
purposes, these reserves have not been generally disclosed on the tax-
payer's tax return.
Under the Code, the only disclosures required are the disclosure of
reportable transactions and the disclosure of positions inconsistent
with Treasury regulations. 95 Prior to 2010, existing corporate tax re-
turns did not require identification and explanation of UTPs that were
uncovered during the process of complying with generally accepted
financial accounting principles. Thus, the IRS had to identify and as-
sess for itself the UTPs that could be associated with a given corporate
tax return. However, the Service cannot through form or regulation
require disclosure of information that is otherwise protected by privi-
lege - an issue that will be discussed in Part IV of this article.
In order to have complete and accurate disclosure on a taxpayer's
return, the Code uses sanctions and civil penalties for understatement
of taxes, which foster voluntary disclosure. 96 In the context of UTPs,
two of these penalties become relevant: (1) negligence or disregard of
rules and regulations, and (2) substantial understatement of tax.97
Negligence exists if the taxpayer fails to take reasonable steps to com-
ply with the tax law. In the context of tax return reporting positions,
negligence exists if no reasonable basis exists for the position (which is
interpreted as a standard higher than "not frivolous" or "merely argu-
able"). 98 This generally means that the taxpayer must have a 15 per-
cent to 20 percent chance of success on the merits if the position were
litigated.99 For purposes of negligence or disregard of rules and regu-
lations, the regulations provide that there is no penalty if the position
is disclosed, or in the case of a position that is contrary to the regula-
tions, represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the regula-
tions. Only with respect to the penalty relating to disregard of rules
94. SCHEDULE M-3 FOR LARGE AND MID-SIZE BUSINESSES (2010), IRS.Oov, http://
www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=119992,00.html.
95. I.R.C. § 6707A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as
amended in 2003).
96. I.R.C. § 6662 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383), triggering a sanction of 20 percent for
one of five different violations including: negligence and disregard of rules and regulations; un-
derstatement of income; valuation overstatement; overstatement of pension liabilities; and estate
or gift tax valuation understatement.
97. There is no accuracy-related penalty tax if the taxpayer shows reasonable cause for the
underpayment and acted in good faith. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2006).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2003).
99. See Burgess W. Raby & William L. Raby, 'Reasonable Basis' v. Other Tax Opinion Stan-
dards, 73 TAX NOTES 1209 (1996).
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and regulations (and not for negligence), is there no penalty if the
taxpayer disclosed the position and had a reasonable basis.
The second penalty type - an accuracy-related penalty for substan-
tial understatement of tax - was established to prevent taxpayers from
taking aggressive tax positions in the face of the IRS's low audit rate.
Thus, this penalty is imposed if the position is not supported by signifi-
cant authority and is not disclosed. 00 Accordingly, the amount of the
understated tax liability will be reduced either because there exists
substantial authority or because it was disclosed. The substantial au-
thority criterion generally means that the taxpayer has a one in three
chance of success on the merits of the position. 101 However, if the
position is attributable to a tax shelter, the understatement is reduced
only if the taxpayer had a more likely than not (i.e., 51 percent)
chance of success.' 0 2 Disclosure does not affect the amount of under-
statement in the context of tax shelters. There are comparable penal-
ties for tax preparers who do not disclose questionable positions on
the return. 0 3
Thus, under the current statutory requirements, there is no disclo-
sure required to avoid a penalty (except in the context of tax shelters)
if the taxpayer reasonably believes that the position taken on the re-
turn is more likely to be sustained than not, regardless of whether the
position ultimately prevails.10 4 Therefore, the Service has generally
used reporting to identify positions that are of extreme importance to
it, including reportable transactions, tax shelters, and positions for
which the taxpayer does not have substantial authority. The Service's
proposed and final positions now compel disclosure of UTPs irrespec-
tive of whether a penalty could have been assessed against the tax-
payer's position. Still, concern as to whether the IRS has the
authority to compel such disclosure remains.10 5
100. There is a similar 20 percent accuracy-related penalty with respect to any understatement
resulting from an adequately disclosed listed transaction or reportable avoidance transaction
(i.e., reportable transaction that involves a sizable tax avoidance purpose). See I.R.C. § 6662A
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383). Such penalty increases to 30 percent for an understate-
ment resulting from an undisclosed listed transaction or an undisclosed reportable avoidance
transaction. Id.
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2009), which uses a one in three, or
greater, likelihood of being sustained on the merits as the standard for "realistic possibility" used
in determining signature of taxpayer on the return.
102. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i)(I1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
103. I.R.C. § 6694 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
104. See Richard M. Lipton, Reporting "Uncertain Tax Positions" Under Ann. 2010-9: Trans-
parency or Overkill?, 112 J. TAX'N 260 (2010).
105. Id.
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The American Jobs Creation Act modified the accuracy-related
penalties for substantial understatement of income tax for corpora-
tions so that it applied only if the understatement exceeded (1) the
lesser of the amount required on the return, or (2) $10 million.10 6 In
addition, a new 20 percent penalty applies for understatements result-
ing from reportable transactions. 10 7 In those contexts, the reasonable
cause exception has been altered so that all relevant facts must be
disclosed, there is substantial authority for the position, and the tax-
payer "reasonably believes" the position was correct. 0 8 Last year,
Congress increased the accuracy penalty to 40 percent if the un-
derpayment is due to a disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason
of a transaction that lacked economic substance. 0 9 Similar penalties
apply to tax preparers for the understatement of taxes."10
The Small Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007 attempted
to raise the standard to avoid penalties for nondisclosure of certain tax
positions by tax return preparers from the realistic possibility of suc-
cess to a more likely than not standard.' This standard was later
changed by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief
Act of 2008, which aligned the tax return preparer penalties with that
of the taxpayer penalties and required disclosure if the position was
reasonable but not supported by substantial authority. 1 2 Thus, to
avoid penalties, taxpayers and tax return preparers must disclose tax
positions on a tax return (other than tax shelters and reportable trans-
actions) for which there is a reasonable basis for the position, but not
substantial authority. Because the IRS disclosure standard of "rea-
sonableness" for tax returns and the FASB disclosure standard of
"more likely than not" for financial statements are not consistent with
one another, it appears that the Service's new rules are attempting to
106. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
107. I.R.C. § 6662A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383) imposes a 20 percent penalty on
the amount of any reportable transaction understatement. The penalty increases to 30 percent if
such reportable transaction was not disclosed under I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(A). See I.R.C. §
6707A(c) for the meanings of "reportable transactions" and "listed transactions." Form 8866,
Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement, is used to identify the type of reportable transac-
tion, to state whether it was purchased through a corporation or pass-through entity, and set
forth the name and address of any person that was paid in connection with the promotion, solici-
tation or recommendation of the reportable transaction or provided tax advice with respect to
such transaction.
108. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383).
109. Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (adding I.R.C. § 6662(i)).
110. I.R.C. § 6694 (2006).
111. Effective for tax returns and claims for refunds prepared after May 25, 2007.
112. Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 506, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
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impose the Small Business and Work Opportunity Act standards
which were rejected by Congress in 2008.113
C. IRS Summons' Power
In addition to its powers to impose returns and schedules, the IRS
also has broad powers of summons under I.R.C. § 7602, subject to two
requirements: (1) the IRS's broad powers extend to determining the
correctness of the return or assessing the tax liability of the taxpayer,
which if met, provides it with the ability "to examine any books, pa-
pers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such
inquiry," as well as summoning the taxpayer, its employees, or any
person having "possession, custody, or care of books of account con-
taining entries" relating to the business of the taxpayer; and (2) if such
powers apply, whether applicable privileges apply to block such dis-
closure. 114 With regard to whether tax accrual workpapers satisfy the
first "relevance" requirement, most courts have supported the stan-
dard that if such documents "might have thrown light upon" the cor-
rectives of the return, there is support for the IRS's summons. 115 In
the seminal case of United States v. Powell,116 the Court reaffirmed the
notion that the IRS did not need to show probable cause in order to
obtain judicial enforcement of its summons. 117 Instead, the Service
need only show "that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose,
that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's
possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code
have been followed."' 1 8 Thus, the Service need only produce a show-
ing of potential relevance without necessitating its ability to admit
such evidence at trial.119 In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the
113. Id.
114. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1)-(2) (2006). While the Service has broad powers to examine books,
records, and witnesses, there are concerns that an examination that is too broad in scope may
result in an unreasonable search and seizure or violate the privilege. See, e.g., United States v.
Wyatt, 637 F.2d 273, 300 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Egenberg, 443
F.2d 512, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1971); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815 (1984).
115. See, e.g., Wyatt, 637 F.2d at 300; Turner, 480 F.2d at 279; Ryan, 455 F.2d at 733; Egenberg,
443 F.2d at 515-16; Foster, 265 F.2d at 187.
116. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
117. Id. at 57-58.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. This relevance standard described by the Second Circuit as a standard as to whether
the documents in question "might have thrown light upon the correctness of the return" was
accepted by most lower courts. See, e.g., Wyatt, 637 F.2d at 300; Turner, 480 F.2d at 279; Ryan,
455 F.2d at 733; Egenberg, 443 F.2d at 515-516; Foster, 265 F.2d at 187.
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Supreme Court further concluded that the Service's powers under
I.R.C. § 7602 extended to certain documents not actually used in the
preparation of the federal tax return, such as tax accrual workpapers,
as such workpapers were "a logical predicate to the question whether
such workpapers should be protected by some form of work-product
immunity. ' 120 This decision was pre-FIN 48 when disclosure was not
addressed issue-by-issue (instead aggregate), and was subject to a dif-
ferent standard for review.
It is the Service's position that it has the authority to request and to
examine tax accrual workpapers under its summons powers. 121 As
noted by Justice Garwood in United States v. El Paso Co., the congres-
sional intent in drafting a broad summons power was "to promote ef-
fective and efficient tax determination and collection," not to facilitate
its examination process. 122 Immediately after the United States v. Ar-
thur Young & Co. decision, the Service self-imposed a policy of re-
straint, whereby it would not generally request the taxpayer's tax
accrual workpapers except in "unusual circumstances," due to the ad-
verse consequences that would result if disclosure was routinely per-
mitted.123 In 2002, the IRS expanded its policy of restraint in two
ways: (1) if the taxpayer disclosed two or more "listed transactions," it
would routinely request tax accrual workpapers but only as they re-
lated to the listed transactions for the year under exam and (2) if the
taxpayer failed to disclose any "listed transactions" or claimed tax
benefits due to multiple "listed transactions," the Service had discre-
tion to issue an information document request ("IDR") for all items
acknowledged in the workpapers.' 24 Failure to comply with this re-
120. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815 (1984).
121. I.R.M., supra note 5, § 4.10.20.4.1.
122. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 547 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J.,
dissenting).
123. I.R.S. Announcement 84-46, 1984-18 I.R.B. 18 (Apr. 30, 1984); I.R.M., supra note 5, §
4.10.20.4. Unusual circumstances exist if the agent needs additional facts with respect to an
issue; the agent "has sought from the taxpayer all facts known to the taxpayer relating to the
identified issue(s)"; and the agent "has sought from the taxpayer's accountant supplementary
analysis (not necessarily contained in the workpapers) of facts relating to the identified issue(s)."
See I.R.M., supra note 5, § 34.12.3.13.1. If unusual circumstances exist, the tax agent is still lim-
ited to those workpapers "material and relevant" to the exam.
124. See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (July 8, 2002); I.R.M., supra note 5,
§ 4.10.20, whereby tax accrual workpapers are those that the taxpayer, its accountant, or auditor
prepare to establish under FIN 48 any tax reserves for current, deferred, and contingent tax
liabilities, as well as footnotes relating to such reserves on the financial statements. A "listed
transaction" is one that the Service has identified as a tax avoidance transaction. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2009). For the list of listed transactions, see I.R.S., LISTED TRANSACrIONS -
LB&I TIER I ISSUES, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,
00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). See also John K. Cook, Jr., IRS Tax Accrual Workpapers
Requests: An (Un)limited Expansion?, 76 PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 260 (2006).
422 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
quest would result in a summons. The Service exercises its new policy
of restraint in exchange for disclosure by the taxpayer of the listed
transaction - meaning nondisclosure results in the penalty of subject-
ing the tax accrual workpapers to disclosure.
With the advent of FIN 48 in 2006, there was concern as to whether
the Service would request tax accrual workpapers, how it would use
the disclosures, and what impact FIN 48 would have on its policy of
restraint. In May of 2007, the Commissioner of the then Large and
Mid-Size Business Division issued a memorandum, which analyzed
the affect of FIN 48 on the Service's policy of restraint in the content
of tax accrual workpapers. t 25 The memorandum affirmed that the
documentation used in FIN 48 analysis was tax accrual workpapers for
purposes of the Service's policy of restraint, but that the Division was
reconsidering its opinion to "ensure that it is still appropriate in to-
day's environment.' 1 26 In addition, there would be a "TAW Cadre"
formed and a publication written, entitled "LMSB Field Examiner's
Guide, FIN 48 Implications," to aid examiners in the context of re-
quests for tax accrual workpapers in response to an Information Doc-
ument Request. 127
IV. THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGES
In the face of the IRS's vast summons powers, taxpayers and third
parties may decline to produce IRS-summoned tax accrual
workpapers by claiming protection under the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege, the Feder-
ally Authorized Tax Practitioner ("FATP") codified in I.R.C. § 7525,
or the work product immunity embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(3). 128 Each privilege has different functions and arises
under different laws/case law. The Fifth Amendment provides that
"no person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself" but applies to any civil or criminal proceeding, both
administrative and judicial. 129 However, the privilege only extends to
individuals, as opposed to corporations, partnerships, or other
entities.130
125. See I.R.S. Office of Chief Counsel Mem. AM 2007-0012 (Mar. 22, 2007).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The American Bar Association had an Attorney-Client Privilege Task Force that issued a
report in 2006, recommending protection of the attorney-client and work product privileges in
the audit situation. See ABA Task Force Examines Attorney-Client Privilege and Audit Disclo-
sures, 2006 TAX NoTEs TODAY 214-84 (2006).
129. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
130. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957).
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A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege arises out of common law doctrine and
is used to protect confidential communications between client and at-
torney relating to legal advice. 131 The public policy supporting this
privilege is to enhance frank and complete dialogue between clients
and their attorneys regarding legal advice. When the communication
involves dual purposes (e.g., factual or accounting information versus
legal communication), one part of the communications may be pro-
tected while the other may not.132 The privilege belongs to the client,
not the attorney; therefore, the client can waive the privilege. Moreo-
ver, the privilege does not extend to information given to the attorney
used in tax return preparation, as that communication is considered an
accounting service. 133 The privilege also does not extend to communi-
cations pertaining to business advice, which includes the information
contained in financial statements. 134 The presence of in-house attor-
neys in making business decisions also does not give rise to the
privilege.1 35
In the context of tax accrual workpapers, the issue arose as to
whether FIN 48 workpapers prepared by attorneys could qualify for
the attorney-client privilege. The answer may depend upon whether
the workpapers looked more like accounting workpapers than legal
workpapers, the latter of which would contain legal opinions, re-
search, mental impressions and legal advice between the attorney and
the taxpayer. It is the IRS's position that tax accrual workpapers do
not constitute legal or tax advice, as they are prepared solely to pro-
131. See generally Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002). In Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader pubic interests in the observance of law and adminis-
trative of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client."
132. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1154 (2000).
133. See United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983); United States. v. Davis, 636
F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); Bernardo v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 677 (1995). But see Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) (extending the privilege to information that was provided in
securing tax advice and tax return preparation); Nancy I. Kenerdine, The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Summons to Produce Documents: Powers, Procedures & Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 73, 100-01 (1979) (noting that the line between accounting work and legal work may be
difficult to draw).
134. See United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984).
135. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Chevron
Corp., No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996); United
States v. Ackert, 84 A.F.T.R. 2d 99-7527 (D. Conn. 1999).
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duce the reserves required under FIN 48.136 If the tax accrual
workpapers are regarded as "legal" by the courts and therefore privi-
leged, a subsequent issue arose as to whether the privilege was waived
when the taxpayer disclosed such documents to the outside and inde-
pendent auditors. As will be discussed later, tax accrual workpapers
produced internally by the client generally have greater protection
under this privilege than those disclosed to the outside accountants, as
the latter have no expectation of confidentiality.
B. Tax Codified Practitioner-Client Privilege
The Code codifies the common law protection of confidentiality be-
tween an attorney and client in the context of tax advice communica-
tions between a FATP (which could include an attorney, an
accountant, an enrolled agent, and an enrolled retirement plan
agent) 137 and client provided the communication would have been
privileged under the similar parameters used under the attorney-client
privilege. 138 The privilege extends only to communications, and not to
work product, and in the case of non-attorneys, the privilege does not
extend when the practitioners are doing other than an attorney's
work. 39 Thus, the privilege does not protect communications for the
preparation of tax returns, nor does it protect accounting advice. 140
Similarly, as noted above, tax accrual workpapers produced internally
by the client generally have greater protection under this privilege
than those disclosed to the outside accountants, because the latter
have no expectation of confidentiality.
C. Work Product Immunity
The work product immunity has been the most protective in re-
sisting IRS summons for tax accrual workpapers in the context of dis-
closure to outside auditors as this immunity is not waivable, but
instead requires a showing of "substantial need" by the opposing side
to overcome the privilege. 141 Unlike the attorney-client privilege,
136. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982).
137. See Treas. Circ. No. 230, § 10.2(a)(5) (2008) (entitled "Regulations Governing the Prac-
tice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, Enrolled Actuaries, and Ap-
praiser Before the Internal Revenue Service"). The term "FATP" includes attorneys, CPAs,
enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and enrolled retirement plan agents.
138. I.R.C. § 7525 (2006).
139. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. KPMG
LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2003).
140. See Frederick, 182 F.3d at 500.
141. The work product doctrine embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) pro-
vides as follows:
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which protects confidential legal communications between client and
attorney, the work product protection protects the litigation process
by keeping an attorney's litigation preparation out of discovery.142
The latter may involve questions of law and fact. Voluntary disclosure
of the work product should not automatically waive the immunity as it
may not necessarily undermine the adversarial process. 143
The attorney work product doctrine was first established by the Su-
preme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,144 and was later partially embod-
ied in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Hickman, the plaintiff's attorney requested notes from the defen-
dant's attorney regarding interviews of prospective witnesses taken to
prepare for trial.145 The Court rejected the attorney's discovery at-
tempt without a showing of need or hardship.1 46 Thus, the Court cre-
ated an immunity against discovery for "documents and tangible
things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" by or
TRIAL PREPARATION: MATERIALS. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise dis-
coverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trail by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (includ-
ing the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only
upon a showing that the parties seeking discovery have substantial need of the materi-
als in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In order-
ing discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or le-
gal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
142. See Henry J. Lischer, Work Product Immunity for Attorney-Created Tax Accrual
Workpapers?: The Aftermath of United States v. Textron, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 503, 532 (2011)
(quoting I.R.S. News Release IR-81-49 (May 5, 1981), which states that "[pL]roper preparation of
a client's case demands that [the lawyer] assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue
and needless interference.").
143. See United States v. M.I.T., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Deloitte LLP,
610 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
144. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The public policy behind such immunity in-
volved several factors: attorneys need a certain amount of privacy in preparing a case; the unfa-
vorable impact that permitted discovery would have on the legal profession; promotion of an
orderly legal system; compelling an attorney to testify as witnesses at trial would result in the
attorney being less an officer of the court and more like a witness. According to the Court,
providing opposing counsel with work product would undermine the legal system:
[M]uch of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation
of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the
interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
Id. at 511.
145. Id. at 498-500.
146. Id. at 510-12.
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for another party or that party's representative (which includes an at-
torney or other representative such and a CPA). 147 Such documents
include the attorney's legal analysis, research, legal theories and
mental impressions. 148 However, the protection is not absolute, as a
showing of necessity may result in the disclosure of the materials (e.g.,
production of facts are essential to the other side's case) or a showing
of an "inability to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information
from other sources without undue hardship."'1 49 A highly litigated dis-
covery issue involves whether the documents in question were pre-
pared "in anticipation of litigation or for trial.' 150
The issue then arises as to whether tax accrual workpapers used to
ascertain UTPs are protected under one or more privileges. Such
workpapers could include: (1) a listing of individual UTPs deemed to
be material and the dollar amount reserved if the taxpayer did not
prevail in litigation; (2) the probability of prevailing in litigation for
each reported UTP; (3) memorandums of in-house attorneys or opin-
ions from outside counsel indicating their opinions as to prevailing on
the merits; and (4) memorandums of in-house accountants or notes
from outside accountants used in making a determination that in-
volved UTPs. Taxpayers obviously argue that disclosure of these
workpapers is protected under one of the above privileges; otherwise,
the IRS may have a clear "roadmap" to identify issues for audit which
in turn would provide it with an unfair advantage in litigating or set-
tling the case.
If the taxpayer/client is a corporation, the use of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege is unavailable. With respect to the attorney/client priv-
ilege, neither the common law nor I.R.C. § 7525 extends the privilege
to tax return preparation, and if the information is shared with outside
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). But see Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, which would have used the
work product immunity to protect from discovery other non-tangible information such as the
attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.
148. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-12.
149. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
150. In footnote nine of the Hickman decision, the Court made mention of an English rule
that extended the privilege to all documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to litigation.
Documents were created for the purpose - but not necessarily the sole purpose - of actual or
expected litigation. This includes documents or "reports by a company's servant, if made in the
ordinary course of routine, are not privileged, even though it is desirable that the solicitor should
have them and they are subsequently sent to him." See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510 n.9. See also
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (protecting a study prepared by an
accountant/attorney "because of" anticipated litigation); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028,
1043 (5th Cir. 1981) (not protecting workpapers used in tax return preparation as they were not
created for actual litigation regarding such returns); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590
(6th Cir. 2006), nonacq., AOD 2007-40 (requiring the attorney to show that workpapers were
prepared in anticipation of litigation and not within the ordinary course of business).
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auditors, there is no expectation of confidentiality, which is required
under the privilege. Thus, many cases hinge on the work product im-
munity to protect tax accrual workpapers, regardless of whether they
are produced internally by the taxpayer or prepared by outside coun-
sel and accountants.
D. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.
In the case of United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the Supreme
Court answered the question as to whether an independent certified
public accountant's tax accrual workpapers (including those used in
evaluating the corporate taxpayer's reserve for contingent tax liabili-
ties) were protected under the work product immunity. 151 During a
routine audit of the corporation's tax return, the Service used its au-
thority under I.R.C. § 7602 to summon Arthur Young & Co., the inde-
pendent auditor to the corporate client, Amerada Hess Corp., to
produce its tax accrual workpapers. 152 Amerada Hess instructed the
independent auditor not to comply with the summons, thus prompting
the IRS to pursue an enforcement action. The district court ordered
that the summons be enforced. 153 The Second Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part, holding that the tax accrual workpapers fell
within the work product immunity.' 54 While such papers were rele-
vant to the Service's audit, the Second Circuit held that the Service
had not rebutted the work product immunity for the papers of inde-
pendent auditors, nor had it sought fraud on the part of the tax-
payer.1 55 It is highly relevant that the case involved the production of
tax accrual workpapers by an outside auditor or CPA firm, as no such
privilege could be invoked if the workpapers were produced internally
by the taxpayer's auditors.
The Supreme Court reversed. 156 The Court acknowledged that the
tax accrual workpapers tracked the auditor's "process of examination
and analysis" used to ascertaining the client's tax treatments, includ-
ing UTPs, including item-by-item review of the client's potential tax
exposure. 157 According to the Court, "the tax accrual workpapers
pinpoint the 'soft spots' on a corporation's tax return by highlighting
151. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
152. Id. at 808-09.
153. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 677
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
154. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S.
805 (1984).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 820 (1984).
157. Id. at 812.
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those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position that
may, at some later date, require the payment of additional taxes. '158
However, the Service's summons power under § 7602 was sufficiently
broad to favor disclosure of all information "relevant to a legitimate
IRS inquiry."'1 59 And while § 7602 was "subject to the traditional
privileges and limitations," there was no confidential accountant-client
privilege under federal law and thus the tax accrual workpapers pre-
pared by an outside accounting firm were subject to disclosure. 160
The Court contrasted the relationship between an attorney and cli-
ent and the relationship between an outside accountant and client as
the accountant in the latter relationship had a responsibility to the
public and the corporation's creditors and shareholders to maintain its
independence from the client and to disclose its interpretations of the
client's financial statements to assure the integrity of the financial se-
curities markets. 161 While there was the potential for management to
fail to disclose potential problems, thereby compromising the audit,
the auditor would simply issue a qualified, adverse, or disclaimed
opinion. 162 Thus, the decision did not address whether an attorney's
thought processes used to determine FIN 48 reserves would be pro-
tected work product.
Following the decision in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the
Service issued Announcement 84-46, in which it affirmed that its pol-
icy of restraint - that it would not routinely request tax accrual
workpapers in all audits.163 The Announcement affirmed that the Ser-
vice would show administrative sensitivity to the accounting profes-
sion and thus not exercise its summons powers except in unusual
cases. In the wake of Enron and other corporate scandals, the IRS
modified its policy of restraint and began requesting tax accrual
workpapers when the taxpayer had engaged in certain listed transac-
tions "that [are] the same as or substantially similar to ones of the
types of transactions that the [IRS] has determined to be a tax avoid-
ance transaction.'1 64
158. Id. at 813.
159. Id. at 817.
160. Id.
161. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15 (1984).
162. Id. at 818.
163. I.R.S. Announcement 84-46, 1984-18 I.R.B. 18 (Apr. 30, 1984). See I.R.M., supra note 5,
§ 4.10.20.3.1(2) (requesting tax accrual papers in "unusual circumstances" or if the taxpayer was
engaged in a listed transaction). The Service realized that without such a policy of restraint,
taxpayers would be reticent in sharing information with outside auditors.
164. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2009). For a current list of such transaction types, refer to
I.R.S., RECOGNIZED ABUSIVE AND LISTED TRANSACTONS - LB&I TIER I ISSUES, available at
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E. Split Among the Circuits
Early on, companies struggled to determine what documents (spe-
cifically tax accrual workpapers) were protected by the work product
immunity, especially those documents initially prepared for non-litiga-
tion purposes.165 Under the criteria that the documents protected be
prepared "in anticipation of litigation," and thus within the purview of
Rule 26(b)(3), it must be that "in light of the nature of the document
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly
be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation. ' 166 The majority of courts adopted a "because of" standard
whereby a document created due to the prospect of litigation would
not lose its protection simply because it was created to foster other
business decisions.167
In United States v. El Paso Co., the Fifth Circuit rejected the pre-
mise that tax accrual workpapers were prepared "in anticipation of
litigation" unless the "primary motivating force" behind their creation
was to prepare the taxpayer's tax return.168 In that case, the corporate
taxpayer refused to disclose tax accrual workpapers pursuant to an
IRS summons conducted in a routine audit of the taxpayer.1 69 Since
no single tax item was under scrutiny by the IRS at the time the pa-
pers were created, routine business processes called for the creation of
the workpapers, not the "press of litigation.' 70 The Third Circuit
later applied the "primary motivating force" rationale in United States
v. Rockwell International.171
After those decisions, the Second Circuit had occasion to decide
whether the work product doctrine extended backwards in time
before trial preparation. In the case of United States v. Adlman, an
attorney was hired by the taxpayer to evaluate the tax results of a
proposed restructuring. 172 The attorney conducted a study to assess
the likelihood of litigation and drafted a memo with his legal analysis
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2011).
165. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998)
166. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979).
167. See id.; Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1992); Binks Mfg. Co., v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1983); Simon
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987); Senate
of Puerto Rico v. United States Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
168. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982).
169. Id. at 533. There, the court noted that tax accrual workpapers are also referred to a
noncurrent tax account and tax pool analysis.
170. Id. at 543.
171. 897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990).
172. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
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as to the likelihood the IRS would challenge the restructuring and the
taxes that would result if it did. 173 In response to an IRS summon for
the memo, the taxpayer cited work product privilege and declined to
produce it.174 The issue before the court was whether documents pre-
pared "because of expected litigation" in the context of making busi-
ness decisions was nevertheless protected under the work product
privilege. 175 The court affirmed protection under the work product
doctrine as the taxpayer would have been left with an "untenable
choice" between the taxpayer asking for advice that would later
prejudice them in subsequent litigation or engaging in a business
transaction without adequate legal advice.176 Hence, the protected
document did not have to be prepared "primarily or exclusively" for
litigation 177 Likewise, the First Circuit followed the Second Circuit's
holding and held that documents created for dual purposes - for liti-
gation and for business reasons - nevertheless could be protected by
the work product doctrine if they had been prepared "because of"
expected litigation.178 The Sixth Circuit also affirmed this approach in
United States v. Roxworthy.179
F. United States v. Textron, Inc.
The battle over work product immunity for tax accrual workpapers
culminated in the First Circuit's United States v. Textron, Inc. deci-
sion.180 In response to an IRS summons requesting all tax accrual
workpapers relating to disclosed listed transactions, the taxpayer as-
serted the work product privilege. The First Circuit had previously
addressed the scope of the work product immunity in a case that did
not involve tax accrual workpapers and affirmed the use of the "be-
cause of" standard, which had been followed by several other
circuits.18 '
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1195-96.
175. Id. at 1197-98.
176. Id. at 1200.
177. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198.
178. See Maine v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002).
179. 457 F.3d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 2006).
180. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320
(2010). See also I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (July 8, 2002), where the IRS
expanded its policy of restraint with respect to any returns filed on or after July 1, 2002, to
situations where the taxpayer claimed a tax benefit from a Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b)(2) "listed
transaction."
181. See Maine, 298 F.3d 60. Other courts of appeals have adopted this standard in the fol-
lowing cases: National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1992); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987); Senate of Puerto Rico v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 262 U.S. App. D.C. 166, 823 F.2d 574, 586 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
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Textron was a publicly traded corporation and was thus required
under federal securities law to have its public financial statements cer-
tified as accurate by an independent auditor.182 As noted earlier,
those financial statements must disclose and account for contingent
tax liabilities. To assure that the outside accountants could determine
the "adequacy and reasonableness of the corporation's reserve ac-
count for contingent tax liabilities," Textron's internal tax attorneys
prepared spreadsheets identifying each debatable tax position, the
dollar amount subject to dispute, and the percentage estimate of the
IRS's success upon the merits. The results from these spreadsheets
could be used to fix the reserve. 183 The information provided was pur-
suant to pre-FIN 48 requirements. 184 The spreadsheets also provided
backup with notes from internal attorneys and outside counsel re-
tained to advise the corporation regarding the reserve require-
ments. 18 5 Textron had shared the spreadsheets with its outside
accountants, Ernst & Young, but refused to disclose them pursuant to
an IRS administrative summons.186
Textron argued at the district court level that that the opinions of
counsel and accountants as to what tax positions could be challenged,
the probability of litigation, and the calculation of the tax reserves had
all been prepared "but for" the fact that the taxpayer anticipated the
possibility of litigation with the IRS. 187 The district court held that the
internal tax accrual workpapers were protected work product as they
consisted of "lists of items on Textron's tax returns, which, in the opin-
ion of Textron's counsel, involve issues on which the tax laws are un-
clear, and therefore, may be challenged by the IRS."'1 88 The court
used the "because of" standard and held that the workpapers were
prepared with the prospect of litigation, thereby denying the IRS's
petition for enforcement of its summons.' 89 A divided panel of the
Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979). For a full discussion of United States v.
Textron, see Lischer, Jr., supra note 142.
182. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78m (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 210 et seq. (2010).
183. Textron, 577 F.3d at 23.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 24.
186. Id.
187. See United States v. Textron, Inc. 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007), rev'd, 577 F.3d
21 (1st Cir. 2009).
188. Id. at 142. The work papers included estimates, in percentage terms, of the taxpayer's
chances of prevailing (the "hazards of litigation percentages") and "the dollar amounts reserved
to reflect the possibility that Textron might not prevail in such litigation (the 'tax reserved
amounts')." Id. at 142-43.
189. Id. at 150 (discussing United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984)).
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First Circuit upheld that ruling and the appellate court granted rehear-
ing en banc.190
The First Circuit held that the only purpose of Textron's tax accrual
workpapers was to fix the amount of the tax reserve on its book so as
to obtain a financial opinion from its auditors.191 Reading the literal
language of Rule 26(b)(3), which requires documents to be "prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial," the court held that the phrase
"in anticipation of litigation" did not extend to documents prepared
for some purpose other than litigation. 192 The First Circuit focused on
the "function" of the workpapers - to assess tax reserves under the
accounting rules - and not the "content" of the workpapers, which
could include legal analysis of "soft spots" on the corporate tax
return.193
Not surprisingly, there was a vigorous dissent, stating that the Cir-
cuit's prior "because of" standard was now being replaced with a "pre-
pared for" standard, asking if the document was "prepared for use in
possible litigation.' 1 94 Thus, the documents must be "for use" in liti-
gation in order to be protected.195 While the dissent noted the right of
the majority to create a new rule for the Circuit, it chastised the ma-
jority, stating that the new rule is "not even a good rule."'1 96 As noted
in Hickman, the result allows the IRS to identify "weak spots" and to
"know exactly how much Textron should be willing to spend to settle
each item."'1 97 It also goes beyond the numbers used to calculate the
reserves and discloses the legal rationale for Textron's view of success
in litigation.198 In fact, the IRS explicitly admitted that this was the
purpose of its inquiry.' 99 The Supreme Court denied the petition for
writ of certiorari of the Textron decision in May of 2010, which will
perpetuate litigation as the circuits are split.2°°
Two subsequent cases are worth noting, as they protected tax ac-
crual workpapers. In Regions Financial Corp. v. United States,201 the
IRS used its summons power to compel disclosure of records of the
taxpayer and its auditor. Portions of the records were either withheld
190. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 21.
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id. at 29.
193. Id. at 31-32.
194. Id. at 32.
195. Textron, 577 F.3d at 33.
196. Id. at 35.
197. Id. at 36.
198. Id. at 37.
199. Id. at 36.
200. Textron, Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010).
201. No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).
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or redacted on the basis that they were either "core documents" (re-
lating to legal opinions, legal analysis, and possible strategies with the
IRS) and "derivative documents" (follow up communication between
the taxpayer and the advisors relating to the core documents).20 2 The
district court held that the documents were protected through the
work product doctrine under the "primary" purpose test, as the tax-
payer solicited such documents because of the possibility of litiga-
tion.203 The fact that such workpapers were used for accounting
purposes did not exclude them from the work product doctrine. 20 4
Similarly, in United States v. Deloitte & Touche USA, LLP,20 5 the
IRS sought to disclose from the taxpayer's independent auditor three
documents - a flow chart prepared by the taxpayer's employees,
memorandum prepared by outside auditors, and a tax opinion pre-
pared by outside counsel - used by the taxpayer in connection with
ongoing tax litigation between the taxpayer and the government. 20 6
As the district court protected the documents from discovery under
the work product doctrine, on appeal the IRS argued that one of the
documents was prepared internally and thus was not protected under
the doctrine, whereas the taxpayer waived the privilege for the other
two documents by disclosing to the outside auditor. 20 7 As the first
document was prepared internally by the taxpayer, the court did not
limit its analysis solely to Rule 26(b)(3) which protects "documents
and tangible things that are prepared ... by or for another party or its
representative. 2 0 8 Instead, the court went beyond Rule 26(b)(3) to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Hickman to protect the attorney's
"mental impressions," that is intangible work products, independent
of Rule 26(b)(3). 209 As to the other two documents prepared as part
of the taxpayer's routine audit process, the court affirmed the "be-
cause of" test used by the Second Circuit in Adlman, thus affirming
the use of the work product immunity for documents developed in
anticipation of litigation even though they had been incorporated into
documents used for audit purposes.210 Thus, the court rejected the
Service's argument that the function of the document, not its content,
202. Id. at *1.
203. Id. at *7.
204. Id. at *7-8 n.ll.
205. 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
206. Id. at 133.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 135.
209. Id. at 136.
210. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 138.
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was critical in determining work product. 211 Thus, a document is pro-
tected under the work product immunity even though it serves dual
purposes, provided it was prepared because of the prospect of
litigation.212
V. SERVICE'S NEW INITIATIVE WITH REPORTING OF UTPs
Given the success that the IRS had in the Textron decision, it issued
Announcement 2010-9213 and Announcement 2010-17,214 noting that
it had broad authority to specify the form and content of the returns
through regulations and thus, it had the authority to require certain
corporations to provide disclosure of UTPs concurrent with the filing
of a return.215 In effect, the Service wanted to rely on the internal
controls necessitated by the financial accounting standards to better
administer its tax system. By requiring reporting of UTPs on the tax
return, the taxpayer would be forced to use the "more likely than not"
financial accounting standard for tax purposes. This standard has not
been normally used in the accuracy-related penalty provisions to com-
pel disclosure. For most of the tax, auditing, and corporate communi-
ties, this was viewed as an expansion by the IRS, requiring tax accrual
workpapers that violated the taxpayer's privilege and circumvented
existing penalty requirements.
A. Announcement 2010-9
In Announcement 2010-9, the IRS stated that it was considering
changes to the reporting requirements concerning UTPs "in order to
improve tax compliance and administration," and thus would be de-
veloping a schedule for taxpayers and related entities (with total as-
sets in excess of $10 million) to report their UTPs. 216 As the U.S. tax
system relies on self-assessment of taxes and returns that set forth the
facts on which tax liability can be assessed and determined, the Ser-
vice noted that it needs to be able to quickly and efficiently judge
significant issues, which include UTPs.217 Due to the fact that FIN 48
211. Id. at 137.
212. Id. at 138.
213. 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
214. 2010-13 I.R.B. 515 (Mar. 29, 2010).
215. I.R.C. § 6011 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383) requires persons or entities liable for
taxes under Title 26 of the United States Code to file a return in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Treasury according to the forms and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary. I.R.C. § 6012 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-383) specifically requires corporations
to file returns, using the forms prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
216. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
217. Id.
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already requires identification and quantification of UTPs for ac-
counting purposes, the Service wished to use such information in un-
derstanding the taxpayer's position and how such positions affect their
tax liability. More specifically, the Service stated "[t]hat information
also would aid the Service in focusing its examination resources on
returns that contain specific uncertain tax positions that are of particu-
lar interest or of sufficient magnitude to warrant Service inquiry, as
well as allowing examination teams to identify all of the issues under-
lying the tax returns more quickly and efficiently. '218 Thus, the Ser-
vice's new position was clearly based on its needs and efficiencies.
The initial proposal was extremely broad and would have required
the following disclosure for corporations that file Form 1120, U.S.
Corporation Income Tax Return provided its total assets were in ex-
cess of $10 million:
* A concise description of each UTP for which the taxpayer has
posted a reserve on its financial statement in accordance with
FIN 48, which included facts sufficient for the IRS to ascertain
the nature of the issue, the rationale for the taxpayer's position,
and the reasons it used in determining whether it was a UTP.
The Service noted the following six elements necessary for the
description: the applicable Code sections; the tax years to which
the position related; whether the position involved an item of
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit against tax; whether it
involved a permanent inclusion or exclusion of any item, the
timing of that item, or both; whether it involved the determina-
tion of the value of property or right; and whether the position
involved a computation of basis.
* For tax positions for which no tax reserve need be established
pursuant to FIN 48, disclosure of any tax position which the tax-
payer expects to litigate or the taxpayer has determined that the
Service has a general administrative practice not to audit such
position.
* For the above reportable UTPs, the maximum amount of poten-
tial federal tax liability attributable to each UTP, ascertained
without regard to risk analysis as to the likelihood of prevailing
on the merits.219 Hence, disclosure was to be the maximum tax
amount the IRS would receive if the position was disallowed
upon audit.
For those taxpayers not complying with the considered changes, the
Service noted that it was assessing options for penalties or sanctions,
218. Id.
219. Id. According to LB&I Commissioner Maloy, the use of the maximum tax adjustment
represented a balance to prevent the IRS from ascertaining the taxpayer's risk assessment. See
DELOITTE, UNCERTAIN TAx POSITIONS AND THE IRS TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE: No HOLDS
BARRED 2 (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20As-
sets/Documents/Tax/ustaxUTP2_072710.pdf.
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including those that could be imposed legislatively.220 Except as pro-
vided in the Announcement, the Service reiterated its intention to ad-
here to its existing policy of restraint for requesting tax accrual
workpapers during an audit.221 The Service asked for comments on
eight particular issues by March 29, 2010.222 The reaction from the
business, legal, and accounting communities was enormous which
prompted the Service to issue Announcement 2010-17,223 which (1)
confirmed that the new schedule would relate to the 2010 tax years
and fiscal years beginning in the 2010 tax years; (2) summarized the
comments received thus far; (3) extended the initial comment period
to June 1, 2010; and (4) invited comments on three new matters.224
B. Announcement 2010-30
In May of 2010, the Service issued Announcement 2010-30, which
explicitly addressed the types of taxpayers subject to the UTP disclo-
sure rules, and issued draft Schedule UTP and related draft instruc-
tions.225 Under the draft schedule and instructions, beginning with the
2010 tax year, taxpayers with audited financial statements226 having
220. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010).
221. Id. The IRS's policy of restraint is set forth in I.R.M., supra note 5, § 4.10.20.
222. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010). The issues for which the
IRS wanted comments included the best way to quantify each UTP (e.g., exact dollar amounts or
dollar ranges); alternative methods of disclosure that the Service could use to determine the
relative value of the UTPs; whether the calculation of the maximum tax liability should relate to
the tax year for which it is disclosed or all tax years for which it relates and whether net operat-
ing losses or excess credits should be reflected; the treatment of related entities; the breadth of
the information required to be disclosed; whether transitional rules should be considered; the
reporting of UTPs for which no reserve is presently required, but a subsequent reserve is later
recorded; and whether disclosure should be different during examination as opposed to tax
returns.
223. 2010-13 I.R.B. 515 (Mar. 29, 2010).
224. Id. The Service requested comments on the following issues: whether the proposed dis-
closure would duplicate reporting already required under other forms, such as Form 8275 and
8275-R; whether pass-through entities and tax-exempt entities should be required to report
UTPs; and how to report UTPs for variety related entity contexts, such as members of a consoli-
dated financial statement or consolidated tax return or entities that are disregarded for federal
tax purposes.
225. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-30, 2010-19 I.R.B. 668 (May 10, 2010). Schedule UTP for
2010 was issued to accompany Form 1120, with related 2010 Instructions for Schedule UTP (Cat.
No. 55028G). A tax position is defined as a position taken on a return that would result in an
adjustment in federal income taxes relating to items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit if
the position is not sustained. 2010-19 I.R.B. at 672.
226. Id. at 674. According to the instructions, an audited financial statement is one in which
an independent third party provided an opinion under GAAP, IFRS, or another country-specific
accounting standard, including modified versions (e.g., modified GAAP) that insist that a tax-
payer reserve for federal tax positions.
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both UTPs and total assets equal or exceeding $10 million would be
required to file the Schedule UTP if it or a related party was:
" A corporation who is required to file a Form 1120, U.S. Corpo-
ration Income Tax Return;
* An insurance company who is required to file a Form 1120 L,
U.S. Life insurance Company Income Tax Return, or Form 1120
PC, U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Company Income Tax
Return; and
* A foreign corporation who is required to file Form 1120 F, U.S.
Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation.227 According to
the instructions, the reported UTPs were the same as set forth in
Announcement 2010-9. Thus, the following UTPs must be
disclosed:
* UTPs for which a reserve is recorded on its audited financial
statement for the current year (e.g., current year's tax posi-
tions, in Part I of the proposed Schedule), or prior year's tax
positions that now require a reserve in the current year due
to uncertainty, in Part II of the proposed Schedule);
* UTPs for which a decision not to record a reserve was made
(as it was determined that there was less than a 50%
probability of settlement with the IRS), the taxpayer is will-
ing to litigate the position and expects to prevail on the mer-
its; 228 and
* UTPs for which a decision not to record a reserve was made
based on the IRS's administrative practice or precedent for
not challenging the position. 229
C. Draft Schedule and Draft Instructions
The draft Schedule was set forth in three parts: Part I disclosed the
UTPs for the decision to reserve (or not to reserve) made at least 60
days before the filing of the tax return; Part II disclosed prior year
UTPs that had not yet been reported on Schedule UTP; and Part III
set forth the "concise description" of each tax position listed in Parts I
and II, along with disclosure of the primary federal income tax code
section that affects the UTP. Once disclosure of the UTP is required,
the reporting is not based on the "measurement amount" under FIN
48, but instead on the maximum tax adjustment ("MTA") that would
227. Id. Excluded from the disclosure requirements were real estate investment trust or regu-
lated investment companies, pass-through entities, and tax-exempt organizations. A related
party is defined as an entity related to the corporation pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 267(b), 318(a) or
707(b), or any entity included in a consolidated audited financial statement which includes the
corporation.
228. Id. at 675. The taxpayer must demonstrate that it would have litigated this position; such
information may be found in the taxpayer's accrual working papers.
229. Id. In this case, the reserve would be the amount of the settlement agreed to with the
Service but for the IRS's administrative practice.
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be then be computed. For tax positions relating to items of income,
gain, loss, and deduction, MTA is estimated as 35 percent (highest
corporate tax rate) applied to the estimated total amounts of those
items. 230 For credits, the total amount of credits in dollars is to be
estimated.231 However, the MTA would not include interest or
penalties.232
It is assumed that the Service required the MTA, instead of the
measurement amounts, to avoid having to invade the taxpayer's pri-
vacy in ascertaining the amount for which it would have settled the tax
position with the IRS. For example, the taxpayer's tax position results
in an exposure of $1 million. Under FIN 48, if it is more likely than
not that its position would be sustained but it would settle at $750,000,
it would reserve the balance of $250,000. Under the MTA, the expo-
sure of $1 million would be expressed.
Similar to the original proposal, Part III of the proposed Schedule
required a concise description similar to that required under An-
nouncement 2010-9.233 Noting that disclosure under the draft Sched-
ule UTP may duplicate other reporting requirements, the IRS stated
that disclosure under Schedule UTP would be deemed disclosure for
purposes of Form 8275 and 8275-R.234
The comments from the public were uniformly negative, including
those from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) 235 and the American Bar Association.236 Understandably,
230. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-30, 2010-19 I.R.B. 668, 676 (May 10, 2010). There is an ex-
ception for UTPs relating to valuation or transfer pricing tax positions. The proposed Schedule
requires the taxpayer indicate whether the UTP is either a valuation or transfer pricing position,
but then only requires the taxpayer to rank, separately for valuation and for transfer pricing
positions, the amount recorded as reserve under FIN 48 or the estimated adjusted to the federal





235. See Letter from Alan R. Einhorn, Chair, Tax Executive Committee, American Institute
of CPAs, to Honorable Douglas H. Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (June 1,
2010) available at http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/Resources/IRSPracticeProcedure/
Advocacy/DownloadableDocuments/F % 20AICPA % 20Comments % 2006.01.2010 % 20on % 20
Ann%202010.9.pdf; Letter from Patricia A. Thompson, Chair, Tax Executive Committee, Amer-
ican Institute of CPAs, to Honorable Douglas H. Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/ResourcesfIRS
PracticeProcedure/Advocacy/DownloadableDocuments/AICPA % 2012.02.2010 % 2OUTP % 20
letter.pdf.
236. See Letter from Stuart M. Lewis, Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association,
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the accountants were more concerned with the differences between
the accounting requirements and the new disclosure on the draft
Schedule UTP, whereas attorneys were more concerned with the pro-
tections afforded under the various privileges, particularly the work
product doctrine. In fact, the Internal Revenue Service Advisory
Council ("IRSAC"), which affords the IRS an organized public forum
with the public to discuss relevant tax administration issues, was criti-
cal of the Services' new approach and the final Schedule in its Novem-
ber 2010 report.237 Some of the comments actually questioned the
Service's legal authority to require disclosure of UTPs.238 The lone
supporter of the Service's proposal was Senator Carl Levin of Michi-
gan, chair of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
fairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, who advocated that
the proposal be strengthened to cover even more taxpayers. 239
D. Reaction from the Practitioner Community
Moving quickly after the comment period, the Service issued pro-
posed regulations on September 9, 2010, under I.R.C. § 6012 (relating
to the returns of income corporations) and § 6011 (relating to persons
liable for a tax imposed by Title 26 that are required to make a return)
affirming the requirements set forth in Announcement 2010-30, appli-
cable for returns filed for tax years beginning after December 15,
2009, and ending after the date of publication of the final regulations
in the Federal Register.240 In effect, the Service was affirming its legal
authority to compel UTP disclosure pursuant to its returns powers.
Comments to the proposed regulations were due by October 12, 2010,
and a public hearing was to be scheduled for October 15, 2010. The
Service affirmed in the proposed regulations that Congress had given
it broad authority in specifying the form and content of tax returns as
long as it promulgates regulations requiring persons/entities liable for
a tax to file such returns.241 By requiring the disclosure of UTPs, the
Service stated that such "information will aid the IRS in identifying
those returns that pose the most significant risks of noncompliance
237. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ADVISORY COUNSEL FACTS, available at http://
www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=167596,00.html.
238. See Firm Seeks Changes in Proposal to Require Reporting of Uncertain Tax Positions,
2010 TAx NOTES TODAY 102-15 (2010).
239. See Sen. Levin Backs Proposal to Require Reporting of Uncertain Tax Positions, 2010
TAX NOTES TODAY 100-14 (2010).
240. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2 (Sept. 9, 2010).
241. Id.
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and in selecting issues for examinations. '242 These proposed regula-
tions were finalized in December of 2010.243
As expected, there were numerous comments to the proposed regu-
lations and a hostile backlash from the tax practitioner community.
The Service classified these comments into five different categories:
* The use by the Service of the disclosed information;
* The intersection of the new disclosure rules with its existing pol-
icy of restraint;
* The burdens associated with the new reporting requirements;
* The change in relationship between the Service and the taxpay-
ers, including its auditors and advisors; and
* The Service's authority to require the reporting of UTPs.24 4
In anticipation of an IRS announcement that it would be releasing a
substantially modified proposed Schedule UTP and its Instructions,
Commissioner Douglas Shulman delivered a speech before the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Tax Committee on September 24, 2010.245 Us-
ing the familiar theme of transparency, Commissioner Shulman
reiterated the goals of the proposed reporting rules for UTPs, which
would promote "certainty regarding the taxpayer's tax obligations
sooner rather than later"; consistency across taxpayers; and efficiency
of government resources. 246 The clear intent of the rules was to assist
the IRS in prioritizing taxpayers for examinations, identify issues
where there was uncertainty in order to further future guidance, and
obtain relevant information regarding UTPs. 247 But to be sensitive to
the tax practitioners' concern that the reported information was too
much and too soon, Shulman noted that relief would be provided.248
As to the second issue of waiver of privilege in connection with UTP,
he noted that the Service would be issuing a second announcement
affirming its policy of restraint and stating that it would not be seeking
documents otherwise deemed to be privileged. 249 By the end, the
damage had been done - pitting the IRS against corporate taxpayers
and their representatives - affording greater distrust and more adver-
sarial relationships between the two.
242. Id.
243. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2 (as amended in 2010).
244. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
245. Douglas Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Prepared Remarks to the
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E. Announcements 2010-75 and 2010-76
By September 24, 2010, the IRS issued two announcements: An-
nouncement 2010-75250 concerning the final Schedule UTP (and its
Instructions), and Announcement 2010-76251 relating to the IRS's pol-
icy of restraint. In the former announcement, the IRS backed off
from a number of its initial proposals in the following respects:
" To afford the covered entities in Announcement 2010-30 addi-
tional time to comply, a five-year phase-in was provided based
on the corporation's asset size. The filing of Schedule UTP
would be required beginning with 2010 tax years for corpora-
tions with total assets equal to or exceeding $100 million (as op-
posed to the proposed $10 million); filing of the schedule would
be delayed to 2012 tax years for corporations with total assets
equal to or exceeding $50 million and to 2014 tax years for cor-
porations with total assets equal to or exceeding $10 million.252
* There will no longer be a requirement to report tax positions for
which no reserve was recorded due to the taxpayer's determina-
tion that the IRS's administrative practice was not to raise the
issue under audit.253 As for the requirement to report tax posi-
tions for which no reserve was recorded because of an expecta-
tion to litigate, the final instructions permit the taxpayer to rely
on its reserve decisions made for financial statement purposes
and therefore, do not mandate the corporation to reassess such
decisions at the time the schedule is completed. 254
* Instead of reporting the actual MTA for each UTP, the final
rules call for a ranking of all reported tax positions for which a
reserve has been taken based on the amount of the reserve (in-
cluding transfer pricing and valuation) and a designation as to
whether the reserve for such position exceeds 10% of the aggre-
gate reserves (i.e. materiality) for all other tax positions reported
on the schedule. For tax positions for which there was no re-
serve required to be posted, no size needs to be determined for
such positions and they can be assigned any rank by the
taxpayer.255
* In the description of each UTP required to be disclosed, the re-
quirements relating to the rationale and nature of the uncer-
tainty have been eliminated as they conflicted with the IRS's
250. 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010).
251. 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
252. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 I.R.B. 428 (Sept. 24, 2010). The final instructions
to Schedule UTP did not exclude Compliance Assurance Program (CAP) or CIC taxpayers from
the reporting requirements. However, the Service expects to issue Schedule UTP compliance in
a forthcoming CAP guidance.
253. Id.
254. Id. The final instructions do not give guidance as to how a taxpayer should document an
expectation to litigate; however, the Service assumes the taxpayer would continue to document
through the same process as used in the FIN 48 rules.
255. Id.
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policy of restraint. 256 Hence, the taxpayer's assessment of the
hazards of the tax position or the pros and cons for the position
do not have to be disclosed. 257 Now the taxpayer need only dis-
close the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the posi-
tion in order to inform the IRS of the identity of the tax position
and the nature of the issue. This latter position is consistent with
the current disclosure requirements under Form 8275.
" To promote consistency between Schedule UTP reporting and
FIN 48 reporting, tax positions that are immaterial under appli-
cable financial accounting standards or are sufficiently certain
such that no reserve is required under such standards do not
have to be reported.258
* Reporting under Schedule UTP involves only U.S. federal in-
come tax positions and not foreign or state tax positions.2 59 The
corporation is to report only its own tax positions on the Sched-
ule UTP, not those of a related party.260
* The final instructions do not provide for any penalties for non-
disclosure or incomplete disclosure. To avoid duplicative filing,
disclosure of a tax position on the Schedule UTP will be treated
as if the corporation filed Form 8275 or 8275-R regarding that
tax position. As long as the transaction is not a reportable trans-
action, disclosure on the Schedule UTP will satisfy the disclosure
requirements of I.R.C. § 6662(i). The Service will continue to
explore avenues to eliminate duplicative reporting
requirements. 26 1
In conjunction with this Announcement, Announcement 2010-76
was issued on the same day, expanding the Service's policy of re-
straint.262 Noting that the identification of UTPs for the new Schedule
UTP occur during the process of preparing financial statements in ac-
cordance with the standards of FIN 48, independent auditors may re-
quest copies of legal opinions and other documents to comprehend
the legal basis for the position and to determine the amount of its
reserves in order to audit the taxpayer's financial statements. There-
fore, the Service affirmed that documents otherwise privileged under
the attorney-client privilege, the tax practitioner privilege, or the work
product doctrine will not be required to be divulged during an audit
on the premise that the privilege has been waived through disclosure
256. Id. Disclosure is now limited to the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the
position so as to inform the IRS of the identity and nature of the position, consistent with its
policy under Form 8275.





262. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
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of the Schedule UTP.2 63 However, if the taxpayer had waived such
privilege, a request for tax accrual workpapers is made in accordance
with the IRS Manual for unusual circumstances, or the taxpayer has
claimed the benefits of a listed transaction, the Service may request
such documents. 264 When requesting tax reconciliation workpapers
during an audit, the current procedures will permit the taxpayer to
redact information regarding the concise description of the UTPs, the
amount of the reserves for each UTP, and computations used to ascer-
tain the ranking of UTPs.2
65
This announcement was followed by a directive to all LB&I person-
nel from Steven Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Services and En-
forcement, reflecting on the policy that the IRS could take regarding
UTPs by its LB&I examiners and personnel. 266 It affirmed that a cen-
tral process would be developed within LB&I to analyze UTPs for a
variety of reasons: identification issues and returns for audit; detection
of trends and areas needed for guidance; proper treatment of UTPs
which could include publishing more guidance, recommendation for
new legislation, and referral for audit.267 Regarding audit techniques
to be used by IRS examiners, the IRS cautioned that examiners would
be approaching an audit with the understanding that UTPs could exist
due to lack of guidance in the law and ambiguity with respect to the
law.268 Hence, such tax positions may not require an audit but simply
aid in the identification of issues by the agent. The Service noted that
its LB&I examiners would receive specific training in the handling of
UTPs.269
VI. CONCLUSION
The new accounting requirements under FIN 48 have caused con-
siderable problems, especially for large publicly traded corporate tax-
payers. It is evident that the IRS wishes to take advantage of the
transparency now required by the accounting and securities law to
compel disclosure under the federal income tax law. Unfortunately, it
is not apparent that it has the legislative authority to do so. While the




266. STEVEN T. MILLER, DIRECrTIVE FOR ALL LARGE BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL Divi-
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tax accrual workpapers, its 2010 initiative relied on its return powers
(not its summons powers) under which it may not have the authority
or the penalty power to force disclosure of UTPs.270 Hence, it is not
surprising that the IRS announcement declares that it will appeal to
Congress for such legislative relief. Whether such appeal will be suc-
cessful remains to be seen.
As taxpayers and advisers sift through the new UTP schedule to
provide a concise description of the UTP and applicable facts, they
will be especially concerned as to whether such disclosure results in a
waiver of privilege. If taxpayers limit descriptions of UTPs in order to
protect related privileges, the Service may end up with very limited
information from the returns. Without the statutory authority to im-
pose a penalty, the Service will be hard pressed to penalize limited
disclosure. Despite its policy of restraint, one may question whether
the tension between the taxpayer's assertion of privilege and the IRS's
policy of restraint worsens the examination process, thereby reducing
audit efficiency.
The greater overall concern is that much discussion between taxpay-
ers and advisors (both accountants and attorneys) will go "under-
ground" in order to avoid such disclosure. Such unintended
consequences of the new UTP disclosure rules would be to the detri-
ment of the IRS. But the much bigger gorilla in the room is simply
that the federal income and corporate tax rules are so complex and
many are so uncertain, that any given corporate taxpayer will have
numerous UTPs that will have to be discussed with the taxpayer and
outside independent auditor/attorney. Congress has this issue on its
agenda for 2011. While the IRS's enforcement costs and resources
may be limited, the productive cost to society as a whole of having
private corporate taxpayers work for the benefit of the IRS is clearly
questionable.
270. See Lipton, supra note 104, at 261 (questioning the Service's ability to compel disclosure
of UTP without regard to whether it could assess a penalty for the position on the return).
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